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Info current as of 15 May 1967

ARAC  
Preliminary Study  
Given me 16 May 1967

ROUTE 110

This portion of the briefing is designed to ~~give you an operational~~ *familiarize you with* ~~analysis of~~ enemy logistical activity along Route 110. The information plotted on the map and discussed throughout this analysis was obtained from aerial sighting reports, road watch reports, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Before proceeding any further Sir, it is necessary for the purpose of clarity and understanding to explain some map symbols which are mentioned throughout this analysis (explain map symbols).

ROUTE 110 (Point to on map) is the main artery utilized in transporting rice from Cambodia into Laos. It is a dirt road, approximately 80 KM in length and 2½ to 3 meters in width, which connects the Se Kong River with Route 96 (Point on map). Route 110 is impassable by vehicular traffic during the rainy season from May to October. There are ten truck parks and six by-passes located along this route, and its importance cannot be overemphasized because it provides the link between Cambodia, and the rice-poor areas further north in Laos, and the VC/NVA B-3 Front Area in western highlands of South Vietnam. (Point on map) Cambodian rice is essential to the Communist forces in the B-3 Front Area because this region is one of the most rice deficient regions in SVN, and most of their rice must be imported from out-of-country sources.

Located adjacent to Route 110 is Base Area 609, an important storage facility and transshipment point (Point on map). It is the southern terminus of the enemy road network in the Laotian panhandle which receives Class I supplies from Cambodia via Route 110, and Class II, III, IV and V

Army review(s) completed.

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*Handwritten notes:*  
Rt 19 more direct

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supplies from North Vietnam via Route 96 (Point on map).

determining  
In ~~estimating~~ the tonnage of supplies being shipped on these two routes, the following criteria was utilized: The Route 96 figure was developed by computing the Class II, IV and V requirements of the units served by Base Area 609, plus the requirements of the 2000 Support Personnel positioned along Route 110 and the lower portion of Route 96. First, we estimated the number of trucks travelling these routes based on the amount of supplies required; secondly, we estimated the POL requirements on the number of truck trips needed to transport the supplies required; and finally, we adjusted the estimated number of truck trips to reflect the additional trips required to move the POL. As a result of the foregoing manipulations, the monthly tonnage of Class II, IV and V supplies arriving at Base Area 609 via Route 96 amounts to 51 tons, Class II and IV combined - 45 tons; Class V - 6 tons. To transport this 51 tons, a total of 25 trucks is required.

25X1

25X1

Of the previously mentioned 1200 tons per month of supplies, mostly rice, which enters Laos over Route 110, approximately 70 tons are consumed by the Support Personnel located on this route, while the remaining tonnage of 1130 is trucked over this same route to Base Area 609. Once at the Base Area, approximately 165 tons are expended by the enemy.

SECRET

Question the figure.  
Retrogressed March 66  
closed May  
rising season  
Not used  
per PICA  
entitled  
of 650 or  
early 67.  
1200 tons  
prob opposite  
only to May Feb 67  
1967. Discont use  
for yearly or bim  
now in part - only for  
now + perhaps future.

SECRET

units and enemy controlled civilians in South Vietnam believed to be served by Base Area 609, thereby leaving 965 tons of the original 1200 available for further disposition. Even if the enemy stockpiled 300 tons per month, there would still be an imposing 665 tons per month left over. It is felt that this remainder, which constitutes over half of the original import, is forwarded to Base Areas 608, 610, and 611, and possibly even to North Vietnam (Point on map).

We believe that the enemy is presently storing large amounts of rice at Base Area 609 to compensate for the effects of the five months monsoon season which involves a substantial reduction in their capability to transport supplies on Route 110. [REDACTED] the commander of the Route 110 support elements hopes to maintain the present rate of traffic during the monsoon by utilizing 2000 bicycles as a means of conveyance for the much-needed supplies. Considering that the road is impassable, even to bicycles, and that there is a monthly requirement of 165 tons of rice, a stockpile of 825 tons of rice is needed. We can, therefore, assume that the enemy stockpiled about 300 tons per month over the last three months, or spread their contemplated needs over a longer period of time, for example, up to six months.

25X1

[REDACTED] the enemy utilizes 140 trucks for transport on Route 110. The average load capacity for these trucks is three tons, and to carry the magic figure of 1130 tons of supplies would require 377 truck loads. Based on the estimate of 377 round trips per month on Route 110, we determined the monthly expenditure of POL along this route to be approximately 10,000 gallons. In addition, Base Area 609 would probably require an additional 2,000 gallons per month for use by

SECRET

expenditure per month in this area is, therefore, 12,000 gallons. This amount can be transported by a minimum of six to eight trucks, and as a result, the additional traffic along Route 96 for moving Class III supplies would be almost negligible.

From the above analysis of enemy supply requirements in the Route 110 area and Base Area 609, the likely enemy movement plan begins to emerge. Their basic problem is to move Class II, III, IV and V supplies south on Route 96 to Base Area 609, and to move principally Class I supplies from Cambodia to the same base area, and from there to the north. As originally stated, Base Area 609, therefore, assumes the important role of trans-shipment point as well as a storage facility. The trucks from the north transporting Class II, III, IV and V supplies, and the trucks from the southwest carrying Class I supplies, all converge on Base Area 609. The trucks from the north discharge their loads, reload with Class I supplies, and return to the north. The trucks from the southwest for the most part have to return to the Cambodian Border area empty, since most of the Class II, III, IV and V supplies delivered to Base Area 609 are destined for use in South Vietnam.

The probable manner of movement of a typical Class I shipment from Siem Pang, Cambodia to Base Area 609, Laos (Point on map) as inferred from various types of reports encompasses the following: Rice is accumulated in Siem Pang in warehouses belonging to Chinese merchants, some of which are under official Royal Khmer Government (RKG) auspices, but most of which are motivated by a profit incentive. The rice is loaded on boats

SECRET

which are similar to dugout canoes with outboard motors, for movement up the Se Kong River to Don Fai Island where the rice is unloaded and put in warehouses. Since this part of the operation takes place almost entirely in "neutral" Cambodia, the trip may be accomplished either in the daytime or ~~night-time~~ <sup>NIGHTTIME</sup>. The actual movement up the river is probably planned so that it takes place during the daylight hours for ease of navigation, but the unloading process is completed at night to avoid detection. Later, as trucks become available, the rice is loaded at night and transported along Route 110 to the area which the Vietnamese refer to as "Hill 200," a distance of approximately 45 kilometers. The drivers have negotiated this stretch of road many times and in this typical night, the rate of march for the three truck convoy is about 5-8 KM's per hour, with only parking lights utilized for illumination. The trucks are forced to stop once for about 30 minutes due to flare aircraft orbiting in the area. Upon arriving in the "Hill 200" area, the drivers bed down for the day. That night, the drivers of the first section of the road transfer their loaded rice trucks to drivers of the second section of the road; in return they receive unloaded trucks for the trip back to Don Fai Island. The drivers of the second segment, utilizing a similar "blackout" type driving SOP, transport the rice to Base Area 609 where it is once again placed in storage. The next night the trucks and drivers return to "Hill 200" area. Occasionally, circumstances compel the trucks to travel on the road during the day, but the NVA attempts to avoid this undesirable situation whenever possible because of the trucks' vulnerability to air

SECRET

strikes. Unlike the units served by the B-3 Area, the enemy forces opposite Base Area 609 are supported directly from 609. Due to a lack of rear service elements, these units assume the internal responsibility for resupply. Normally it is accomplished by replacement, and through cache areas near the border.

Up to the present time, this briefing has been centered on the enemy's traffic on Route 110 during what can be considered a "normal" or "typical" period. At this time Sir, I would like to elucidate on the validity of the information received [redacted] since much of our analysis is based on this and other similar type data acquired from the [redacted]

As a result [redacted] a four day air operation consisting of 164 day and night sorties was conducted against the western portion of Route 110 during the period 27-30 Apr 1967. The successful results of this operation can be indicated by the 148 secondary explosions and 30 secondary fires, and a complete renovation in the enemy's convoy tactics. Prior to above-mentioned air operation, total truck sightings during an average week rarely exceeded 40 trucks. Convoys normally averaged about 2-3 trucks, and road watch teams apparently encountered only moderate difficulty in maintaining fixed positions. However, following the successful air operation, total truck sightings for a week's period amounted to more than 70, with the data still incomplete. The convoys are now composed of up to 20 trucks, as opposed to the previously mentioned 2-3 truck convoys prior to the air operation. The upward trend in truck traffic since the air strikes is probably a result of the enemy's desire to complete his resupply prior to the closing of Route 110 by the monsoon. The recent

*elsewhere  
reported  
121  
explosions  
27  
secondary  
fires*

SECRET

air strikes has undoubtedly added to this sense of urgency. In addition, the unexpected magnitude of the results of the air strikes, notably the inexplicable number of secondary explosions, tends to indicate the possibility that Class III and V supplies may also be entering Laos from Cambodia at the west end of Route 110. Road watch teams are apparently encountering increased difficulty in maintaining their fixed positions, and enemy harassment of the friendly base at Kong My has increased. (Point on map).

As you know Sir, our purpose in preparing this study was to determine if operational research could be utilized in constructing a movement model for Route 110 which could be applied to other routes. Due to a paucity of available data, operational research on this route has yielded results that are less than conclusive; however, we were able to arrive at a tentative movement pattern. An important bonus effect, which is being further investigated, did result from our research. Heretofore, we believed that all Class V supply was being transported into Base Area 609 from the north; however, the secondary explosions caused by the air strikes indicate that large quantities of explosive materiel, munitions, and <sup>may be</sup> POL <sup>probably is</sup> are being dispatched from Cambodia to enemy units in Laos along Route 110.